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1   Motivation & Objectives 
 
The received wisdom about tacit collusion is that it is more likely the fewer 
leading players there are in a market, and the more symmetric they are.  This 
was recognised long ago in the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, 
and subsequently formalised by the theory of repeated games.1  However, in 
spite of the theoretical consensus, the empirical literature offers few stylised 
facts on the most simple of questions – how few is few, and how symmetric is 
symmetric?  Given that the concept is somewhat elusive and the practice not 
illegal, this is probably unsurprising, but it certainly contrasts with the 
burgeoning empirical literature on hard-core collusion (for example, Harrington 
(2005) and Bolotova et al (2006).   
 
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to fill this gap in knowledge, albeit in 
an indirect way.  While there may be no existing large database of cases 
involving policy intervention to combat tacit collusion – unlike hard-core cartels 
– there is one area of policy where Competition Authorities (CA) do assess 
the prospects of tacit collusion and intervene accordingly.  This is in the area 
of merger control for the subset of cases which may have coordinated 
effects/collective dominance.2  In most major jurisdictions, one might expect to 
observe a reasonably large number of such cases, potentially providing the 
scope for constructing a database sufficiently large to support econometric 
analysis designed to uncover stylised facts about the sorts of markets and 
market structures that are associated with tacit collusion – at least as seen 
through the eyes of the CA. 
 
This is the objective of the current paper, using the European Commission as 
an example of a CA.  More specifically, the purpose is to identify the implicit 
structural model, especially the roles of concentration and size asymmetries, 
that the Commission has used to identify (and therefore prohibit or remedy) 
those mergers which it believes will lead to collective dominance.  Of course, 
it can be argued that, even if we are successful in this venture, our results 
might reveal very little about tacit collusion per se, as opposed to merely the 
Commission’s own conjectures and understanding of it.  We accept that it 
must be an open question as to whether the Commission has the ‘right’ 
model.  But, even if not, our analysis is still of interest within the policy 
literature, given the controversies of recent years, for example, concerning the 
Commission’s decisions in celebrated cases such as Airtours (1999), the 
academic critique of the Nestle-Perrier case (Compte et al, 2002), and the 
2004 revision to the European Merger Regulation.3      
 
We proceed by first isolating from the population of about 3,000 mergers 
considered by the Commission over the years 1991-2004 those in which it 
appears to have seriously considered collective dominance as a potential 
outcome.  This identifies just 62 mergers which, between them, impacted on 
(i.e. had overlaps between the merging parties in) 367 different markets.  This 
                                                 
1
  For examples, see Scherer and Ross (1970) and Ivaldi et al, (2003) respectively. 
2
  Hereafter, we employ the European terminology, Collective Dominance.  In the next section, we 
explore terminology a little further. 
3
  See also Kuhn (2001) for a discussion of some of the policy issues raised here. 
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forms our core database.  Preliminary descriptive statistics establish a number 
of facts – the two most striking are that: (i) most of the markets concerned 
have no more than two or (much less frequently) three major players, and (ii) 
with just a single exception, the Commission only ever identifies collective 
dominance with a market of two major firms.  Building on these facts, we 
construct and then test a simple structural model, designed to predict under 
what circumstances the Commission will judge a market to be collectively 
dominant, as opposed to singly dominant, or neither.  To our knowledge, there 
have been no previous studies devoted exclusively to the decisions of a CA 
on collective dominance (coordinated effects).  While there has been a fairly 
large literature attempting to econometrically explain the decisions of CAs in 
merger analysis (and other areas of competition policy), rather strangely, 
previous studies have typically not differentiated between unilateral and 
coordinated effects, implicitly assuming that the same model applies to both. 
Below, we briefly survey this previous literature and argue that it is deficient in 
two other respects.  First, it tends to be over-reliant on explanatory variables 
which are based on subjective qualitative assessments of key variables such 
as barriers to entry and buyer power.  We argue that the use of such variables 
runs the risk of circularity (information is usually taken directly from CA reports 
justifying their own decisions) and also fails to acknowledge that such 
‘variables’ should be often treated as necessary conditions.  Second, 
invariably, studies characterise a CA’s decision in a particular merger as 
simply intervene/not intervene.  In fact, most mergers involve a number of 
different markets, and it is common for the CA to intervene in some of those 
markets but not others – ignoring this within-merger dimension, the analysis 
discards a potentially rich source of extra information.   
 
In contrast, our approach avoids the need to measure the unmeasurable 
(such as barriers to entry).  We do this with careful sample selection designed 
to control for such factors.  We also exploit within-merger heterogeneity by 
making the individual market, rather than the aggregate merger, the unit of 
observation. This means we attempt to predict not just whether the CA 
intervenes in a merger but also whether it intervenes in some but not other 
markets covered by that merger.  Since it is quite common for the European 
Commission to judge that a given merger is singly dominant in one market but 
collectively dominant in another, our model must also be able to discriminate 
by type of competitive harm. 
 
Using a multinomial logit estimator, we find that a simple structural model, 
based only on information on the market shares of the two largest firms, is 
able to correctly predict 80% of the Commission’s decisions, including those 
on collective dominance.  As already mentioned, with a singular exception, the 
Commission only ever equates collective dominance with two major firms in a 
market, and, even then, requires a relatively high degree of symmetry 
between the market shares of those firms.   
 
In the concluding section we return to our initial theme, and ask what do these 
results tell us about tacit collusion?  Perhaps very little – if one is not prepared 
to credit the European Commission with the ability or skill to predict the 
structural circumstances under which it is likely to occur.  However, less 
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sceptically, we suggest that, superficially at least, these results are in stark 
contrast with what we know about cartels.  It is evident from the literature that 
cartels typically involve more than just two firms, and size asymmetries within 
the cartel can be far more pronounced than those identified in our results.  We 
end by speculating on a future research programme which might explore the 
interface between hard- and soft-core collusion. 
 
 
The paper has eight more sections.  Section 2 briefly surveys relevant 
previous literatures.  Section 3 describes the construction and main 
characteristics of the database; all EU mergers with the potential for collective 
dominance.  Section 4 introduces a new geometric construction – the 
oligopoly triangle - which proves to be a useful device for clarifying how best 
to measure the key elements of market structure – concentration and 
asymmetry.  Section 5 presents a model of the CA’s decision-making, which 
allows the CA to decide between intervening and not-intervening in a 
multimarket merger on a market-by-market basis.  Section 6 describes our 
empirical methodology, and section 7 reports the results of estimation.  
Section 8 explores some of the direct and indirect implications of our results. 
 
 
 
2   Previous relevant literatures 
 
Terminology 
Throughout this paper, we take the term ‘collective dominance’ (European 
parlance) to be synonymous with ‘coordinated effects’ (US).  Both terms refer 
to mergers where it is anticipated that the firms remaining in the market post-
merger (including the merged firm) would be likely to coordinate their actions.  
Clearly, no CA could allege that such coordination would amount to formal 
collusion – to block a merger on such an interpretation would be tantamount 
to asserting that post-merger, firms would act illegally.  Rather, coordination 
must refer in effect to ‘tacit collusion’, the spirit of which is still captured 
perfectly by Chamberlin’s oft-quoted words of nearly 80 years ago: 
 
"If each (firm) seeks his maximum profit rationally and intelligently, 
he will realise that when there are only 2 sellers, his own move has 
a considerable effect upon his competitors, and that it makes it idle 
to suppose that they will accept without retaliation the losses he 
forces upon them.  Since the result of a cut by any one is inevitably 
to decrease his own profit, no one will cut, and although the sellers 
are entirely independent, the equilibrium result is the same as 
though there were a monopolistic agreement between them" 
(Chamberlin, Monopolistic Competition, 1929). 
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Thus, we take collective dominance,4 coordinated effects and tacit collusion to 
be synonyms. 
 
Theoretical literature on tacit collusion and asymmetries 
The conventional interpretation of tacit collusion as a potential equilibrium 
outcome of a dynamic non-cooperative game is well summarised, for 
example, by Ivaldi et al (2003) writing for the European Commission.  They 
derive the standard results on the market conditions under which tacit 
collusion is likely: (i) fewness of competitors, (ii) symmetry of market shares, 
(iii) entry barriers, (iv) frequent interaction, (iv) price transparency, and a 
number of other factors.  Table 6 below confirms that the European 
Commission often takes account of such factors when coming to decisions on 
collective dominance.  But it is the first two – we shall call them the ‘structural 
model’ – that are our main interest here. 
 
As Ivaldi et al note, market share asymmetry is important, not only in its own 
right, but also because of the underlying asymmetries it may reflect.  In recent 
years, the theoretical literature has explored various possibilities: Rothschild 
(1999) on costs, Compte et al (2002) on capacity, Kuhn (2004) on the number 
of products, Vasconcelos (2004) on capacity/costs.  Although the details of 
these models vary, the underlying mechanism always works through the 
asymmetry this causes between firms in the profitability of/ability to punish 
and/or deviate.   
 
Turning to the empirical literature, very little is known about asymmetries and 
tacit collusion; indeed, there does not even appear to be much evidence on 
firm numbers.  There are of course many industry case studies which attempt 
to deduce from observed conduct whether firms are behaving in a tacitly 
collusive, as opposed to competitive, manner,5 but, as far as we know, there 
is no body of studies on which we can draw to answer questions such as: 
what sorts of firm numbers and what sorts of asymmetries are consistent with 
tacit collusion? 
 
Empirical modelling of CA merger decisions 
Faced with this paucity of empirical knowledge, we approach the subject 
indirectly, using data from the one area of competition policy where it is 
possible to assemble a relatively large body of cases where tacit collusion is 
at least a possibility, i.e. mergers with potential for creating collective 
dominance. 
 
There is already a sizeable and growing empirical literature which attempts to 
explain CA decisions on mergers (and other areas of anti-trust policy), in 
                                                 
4
 In the current paper, we side-step the policy debate concerning the so-called ‘gap industries’ (see, for 
example, Baxter and Dethmers (2005)).  These are markets (prior to the introduction of a substantive 
test in the ECMR in 2004) where unilateral effects might have occurred but could not be pursued by the 
Commission because ‘single dominance’ was not satisfied.  It might be argued that some cases prior to 
2004 were pursued under collective dominance because the option of unilateral effects was not open to 
the Commission.  In that sense, there may be a doubt as to whether all cases of collective dominance 
really can be identified with tacit collusion.  In future work, we intend to compare EC practice before and 
after 2004, and with UK practice.    
5
 Early examples are Bresnahan (1989) and Slade (1987), and more recently Slade (2004). 
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terms of the structural and other characteristics of the firms and markets 
concerned, but rather strangely most of it ignores the distinction between 
coordinated and unilateral effects. 
 
Early work by Coate and McChesney (1992), Khemani and Shapiro (1993), 
and Weir (1992, 1993) focussed on the US, Canada and the UK, but 
increasingly in recent years, the decisions of the European Commission have 
attracted more attention, exploiting the large database of reports on the 
Commission’s website.  Table 1 provides a non-exhaustive listing of the main 
and/or most recent contributions. 
 
Table 1  Previous econometric studies of CA merger decisions 
 
 Data Period Sample 
size 
Dependent variable(s) 
Coate & McChesney 
(1992) 
US Mergers 
(FTC)  1982-86 70 
 
Decision to challenge merger 
Khemani & Shapiro 
(1993) 
Canadian 
Mergers 
(Director of 
Investigation 
& Research)  
 
1986-89 75 
Merger decision: 
- no issue 
- monitor 
- restructure 
- challenge 
Weir (1992), (1993), UK Mergers (MMC)  1974-90 70  & 73 
Merger decision: 
- allow 
- disallow 
Davies et al (1999) 
UK 
monopoly 
abuse 
(MMC) 
1973-95 73 
 
Adverse finding 
 
Duso et al (2003) EC Mergers 1990-2002 167 
Probability of type I errors in sample 
of pro competitive mergers & type II 
errors in anti-competitive mergers 
(event study) 
Lauk (2003) 
German 
Abusive 
practices & 
cartels 
Federal 
Cartel Office 
1985-
2000 196 
 
Adverse finding 
Lindsay et al. (2003) EC Mergers 2000 - 2002 245 
Clear merger 
and 
- divestiture remedy 
- alternative remedy or prohibition 
Schinkel et al (2004) 
European 
Antitrust 
Cases 
1964-
2002 All 
1) Infringement decision 
 2)   Decision to appeal  
 
Bergman et al (2005) EC Mergers 1990-2002 96 
1) Initiate a Phase 2 investigation 
2) - Allow (incl remedy)  
    - Prohibit merger 
Coate and Ulrick (2005) US Mergers 
1996-
2003 151 
Clear merger 
Grout and Sonderegger 
(2005)  
EU & US 
Cartels 
1990-to 
date 70+68 
Inter-industry difference in 
incidence of cartels 
Bougette and Turolla 
(2006) EC Mergers 
1990-
2005 229 
1) - phase 1 no remedies 
- phase 1 remedies  
 8 
- phase 2 no remedies 
- phase 2 remedies  
2)  As above but distinguish 
between type of remedy 
Brown and Hesse 
(2006) 
UK Mergers  
(OFT & CC) 
1998-
2004 177 
 
Clearance decision 
 
 
Although these studies differ in their objectives and detail, it is possible to 
stylise most as follows.  The typical database is cross-section, covering a 
large number of different merger decisions over a given time period.  The unit 
of observation is the individual merger, and the dependent variable is the CA’s 
‘decision’ on the merger – this  might refer to outright prohibition, but is more 
generally whether the CA requires remedies before the merger is allowed.  
Typically, the probability of intervention (P) is posited to depend on three 
vectors of explanatory variables:  
 
P = P(S, X, Z)       
    
S are market share and concentration type variables (e.g. HHI, the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index) measured as both the levels and changes 
resulting from the merger; X are other market characteristics, such as entry 
barriers and buyer power, and Z is a vector of sundry, mainly 
institutional/political variables, such as the identity of the EC Competition 
Commissioner in EU cases, the nationality of firms etc.  Typically, econometric 
estimators are logit, probit, ordered probit or multinomial logit.  The strongest 
results are usually obtained for the market structure variables – invariably, the 
probability of intervention increases with the level and increase in the HHI 
index and with the level and increase in the market share of the merged firm.  
Barriers to entry are also usually strongly significant, especially where 
interacted with concentration.   
 
Although none of these studies specifically focusses on collective dominance, 
they do raise some issues which are of direct relevance to our own work.  
First, although collective dominance may not have been the primary concern, 
most merger samples will include at least some mergers of this type.  Rather 
strangely, with only one real exception, these studies fail to distinguish 
unilateral and coordinated effects.  Implicitly, this means that the same 
structural model has been assumed for both types of merger.  This is a 
serious limitation.  For example, as shown below, an increase in the HHI index 
will typically increase the chances of unilateral effects, but not, typically, of 
coordinated effects.  Similarly, while an increase in the size of a number two 
ranked firm may sometimes increase the chance of coordinated effects, it is 
less likely to be identified with a strong unilateral effect – indeed, it may 
sometimes be viewed as an important constraining influence on the 
dominance of the first-ranked firm. 
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Coate and Ulrick’s study (2005) of US mergers is the one serious exception,6 
in that their structural model differs between unilateral and coordinated 
effects.7   However, their criterion for distinguishing the types of market prone 
to the two different effects is somewhat arbitrary, not to say puzzling.  They 
assume that the theory of concern will be coordinated effects if either: (i) the 
product is homogenous and there are more than two pre-merger rivals to the 
merging firms, or (ii) the product is heterogeneous but the merging parties 
have a market share of less than 35%.  Otherwise the theory of concern will 
be unilateral effects.  Testing this model, they find that, in potential unilateral 
effects (as just defined) cases, it is the number of rivals which seems to drive 
the CA’s decisions, while it is the level and change in the HHI index which 
matter in potential coordinated effects markets.  It is not obvious to us how 
either the distinguishing criterion or these results relate to any known theory.  
For example, we show below that the HHI index should not be a good 
predictor of the likelihood of coordinated effects.  Moreover, prevailing theory 
suggests that collusion is more likely in homogeneous product markets with 
fewer firms – Coate and Ulrick seem to discount the possibility that tacit 
collusion can occur in homogenous product markets with fewer than three 
firms. 
 
Second, the typical data sources for these studies are the merger decision 
reports of the CAs, and this necessarily constrains the analysis.  Of particular 
concern are variables such as entry barriers, buyer power, price transparency 
etc, for which most studies construct simple binary high/low proxy variables, 
where ‘high’ is based on a necessarily subjective reading of the case details.  
For example, with barriers to entry, invariably, ‘high’ is recorded if the CA itself 
identifies high barriers.  This raises the obvious doubt that the CA will be self-
justifying in its written description of cases; thus, a CA is unlikely to pass a 
merger without intervention if it has noted that entry barriers are high, or to 
block a merger in spite of admitting that barriers are low.  It is difficult to see 
how artificial measures such as this would ever prove to be insignificant in 
explaining decisions.   
  
Third, and focusing now on European Commission cases, most mergers 
impact on a number of different product and geographical markets.  It is not 
uncommon for the Commission to intervene, for a given merger, in some but 
not all of the markets covered.  However, most empirical studies characterise 
the Commission’s decisions only at the overall merger level.  Where the 
intervention is prohibition of the merger as a whole, this is natural, but when 
targeted at just some of the markets covered by the merger, there is an 
obvious aggregation problem.  Consider two different mergers: A, a single 
market merger in which the Commission requires a remedy, and B, covering 
20 markets in only one of which is a remedy is required.  A simple 
dichotomous intervention/non-intervention distinction would record A and B as 
                                                 
6
 Bergmann et al (2005) also make a token allowance for the difference between unilateral and 
coordinated effects, by including an additional explanatory dummy variable, which takes the value of 
unity ‘if the Commission finds that the firms will be collectively dominant after the merger’.  Not only is 
this tautological in that such a variable would seem to be certain to predict the Commission’s decision to 
intervene, but also the inclusion of such a dummy variable implies a simple shift effect, rather than the 
possibility that a quite different structural model is required to explain coordinated effects. 
7
 Even in this case, however, the discussion is relegated to an under-emphasised Appendix of the paper. 
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equivalent.  Moreover, in B, how should market shares, market structure and 
the other explanatory variables be measured?  Some studies, e.g. Bergman et 
al. (2005) choose to represent the merger by the market in which the 
competition problems were most severe; alternatively, one might measure 
variables at their mean or representative values across markets.  However, 
any such solutions are not only imprecise, but also discard valuable intra-
merger variance: between-market within-merger differences in both the 
decisions and market characteristics offer the potential for a much deeper 
analysis of the CA’s model.   
 
Our research methodology will aim to exploit this intra-merger dimension.  Our 
main focus is on structural variables, but we will not assume that the CA 
employs the same model when deciding collective and single dominance, 
and, given our primary interest in asymmetries and tacit collusion, we will not 
rely on concentration measures, which do not take account of asymmetries.  
The methodology we use also side-steps the need to employ judgemental 
dummy variables reflecting factors such as barriers to entry. 
 
 
 
3 The database of EU mergers involving potential collective 
dominance 
 
Our first task is to identify from the population of all mergers on which the 
European Commission published a judgement, 1990-2004, the subset in 
which it appears to have contemplated collective dominance as a potential 
consequence.  Having identified this subset, we present some key 
characteristics of the markets concerned and the Commission’s decisions.  
 
Merger control in the EU  
Since the European Merger Regulation (ECMR) came into effect in 1990, the 
European Commission has published decisions on approximately 3000 
mergers.8  The Regulation was revised in 2004 and to avoid any possibility of 
structural breaks since 2004, we confine analysis to the years 1990-2004. 
Appraisal of any merger may involve one or two phases.  In Phase 1, the 
Commission undertakes an initial investigation: in about 90% of all mergers, 
no competition concerns were raised in this Phase, and the mergers were 
allowed to proceed without modification.  Of the remaining 10%, in about half, 
commitments (remedies) were agreed in Phase 1, and on that basis, the 
merger was allowed to proceed.  However, in 127 other cases, the appraisal 
went to a Phase 2, more extensive, investigation.  Here, remedies were much 
more likely (77), and, in the extreme, the merger was blocked entirely (in 19 
cases). 
 
Thus, outright prohibition is relatively uncommon, but in about 200 other 
cases, the Commission required commitments from the merging parties to 
                                                 
8
 These are all mergers with a European, as opposed to purely national, dimension, and which exceed  
specified turnover thresholds. 
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remove specific competition concerns.  Throughout this paper, the term 
‘intervention’ will be used to encompass not only outright prohibitions but all 
cases of commitments/undertakings/remedies agreed or imposed in either 
Phase.  It is important to remember that, where an intervention takes place, 
very often this will relate to only some of the markets involved in a given 
merger. 
 
Identifying mergers potentially involving collective dominance: the CD 
sample 
Within this population, we word-searched all merger reports for the use of one 
or more of the following phrases: collective dominance, (tacit) collusion, joint 
dominance, oligopolistic dominance or coordinated effects.  This isolated 94 
candidate mergers, but closer textual examination revealed that in 32, the 
above phrases were only used in a cursory manner – typically in a throwaway 
single sentence or short paragraph, revealing that the Commission had easily 
dismissed the possibility.  In each of the remaining 62 mergers, the text of the 
Commission’s report includes a non-trivial discussion of the possibility that the 
merger might lead to collective dominance in at least one of the markets 
potentially impacted upon by the merger.  It is this subset of cases which 
forms  the database for the current paper.  Hereafter, it is referred to as the 
CD sample. 
 
Some key characteristics of the CD sample mergers 
 
A Collective dominance is an issue in a only a small proportion of all 
mergers   
In no year of this period did the mergers in this sample account for more than 
4% of the total.  This suggests that it would be futile to use this database to 
test any time series based hypotheses (for example, that the Commission was 
increasingly more inclined or disinclined over time to intervene on the grounds 
of collective dominance).  
 
B All mergers are horizontal  
A reading of the merger reports confirms that there are no instances which 
entail significant vertical or portfolio dimensions. 
 
C Most mergers are multimarket, but typically involve similar product 
markets 
In any jurisdiction, most big mergers will involve more than just one product 
market, and in the European context this is likely to be even more pronounced 
due to the important geographical dimension - most mergers impact on more 
than just one Member State, and, more often that not, the European 
Commission judges markets to be national rather than europe-wide or world-
wide.  (For this sample, over 60% of markets were judged to be national.) 
 
In this set of 62 mergers, we have identified 367 different markets in which the 
Commission reported overlaps between the merging parties, and for which 
there are useable data.  Thus, the average merger covered six different 
markets, but the distribution is heavily skewed around this average (Table 2).   
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Table 2 Number of product markets by merger 
 
  Number of mergers involving: 
Markets Mergers  
Only one 4-
digit industry 
Two 4-digit 
industries 
Three 4-digit 
industries 
1 18 18   
2-4 27 26 1  
5-9 6 4 2  
>10 11 7 3 1 
Total 62 55 6 1 
 
 
However, for nearly all 62 mergers, the different markets covered are very 
closely related in product space.  This is either because the merger impacts 
on exactly the same product market in more than one country, and/or 
because, even where more than one product market is involved, they are 
closely related.  For example, in terms of the NACE industry classification, 
used by the Commission, for 55 of the mergers, all markets covered by each 
merger belonged to the same 4-digit industry9 and six involved only two 4-digit 
industries.10  As will be seen this is an important feature of the data. 
 
D Markets typically involve only one, two or sometimes three major 
players 
Most EC merger decision reports provide sufficient information to estimate the 
market shares of the leading players in each market, both before and after the 
proposed merger.11  However the Commission very often only reports shares 
within size bands, e.g. 30-40%.  In those cases, our standard procedure is to 
take the midpoint of the range. This is unavoidable, but it is acknowledged 
that this adds a degree of imprecision to all results reported in this paper.  But 
with this caveat, these market share data provide a rare insight into the types 
of market structures which may be considered to be conducive to tacit 
collusion, at least, as seen through the eyes of one major CA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The market definitions used in CA investigations, including mergers, are typically less aggregate than 
the 4-digit level.  Nevertheless, the 4-digit definition is still fairly disaggregated and typically groups 
together markets which are closely related on both the demand side and in terms of technology.  There 
are over 700 4-digit industries 
 (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/#by_nace). 
10
 Even the one exception (Alcan-Pechiney) involving three 4-digit industries was confined to a small 
cluster within the Aluminium sector: Licensing of technology (CB.13.20), Standard flat roll products 
(DJ.27.32) and Cans, foil, packaging, aerosols etc (DJ.28.72). 
11
 It is the convention for most CAs to ‘estimate’ the post-merger market share of the merging firms by 
simply adding their pre-merger shares.  We also adopt this convention here.  However, it should be 
emphasised that this is not the same as the actual market share of the merged firm post-merger.  Not 
only is the report produced at the time of the proposed merger, and is ex-ante, but it also fails to 
acknowledge a general result from the theoretical equilibrium literature – typically, a merging firm will 
choose to produce less after the merger than did the sum of the constituent firms pre-merger (see, inter 
alia, Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Salant et al (1983)). 
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Table 3   Post-merger market shares* in the CD sample 
 
Number of markets with: 
Range (%) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Si > 10 366 340 186 53 8 
Si > 15 361 286 75 9  
Si > 20 353 240 33   
Si > 25 328 163 3   
Si > 33 267 87    
Si > 40 157 11    
Si > 50 78     
Si > 60 36     
      
Mean 42.4 25.3 11.8 6.4 3.5 
Max 95 47.6 33.3 20 15.8 
Min 5 3.7 0 0 0 
* See note 14 for definition of post-merger shares. 
 
 
Table 3 reports the distribution of market shares across markets for each of 
the top 5 largest firms.  As an illustration of how to read the table, suppose a 
‘significant’ market share is defined to be 15% or more.  In that case, reading 
backwards across the second row, the sample includes 9 markets in which 
there are four significant players - call them quadropolies; 66 (=75-9) 
triopolies; 211 (=286-75) duopolies; and 75 (=361-286) monopolies.   
 
Of course, 15% is an arbitrary yardstick, but any plausible alternative would 
yield a qualitatively similar conclusion: broadly speaking, markets in this 
sample are typically very small-number oligopolies.  The large majority (about 
75% on our criterion) are either monopoly or duopoly, with the other 25% 
being triopolies or, in a very few cases, quadropolies.  This is confirmed by the 
modal size classes (not visually obvious from this form of the table): 40-50% 
for the #1, 20-40% for the #2; and 0-10% for 3rd, 4th and 5th firms.  A similar 
pattern is true for the means.  
 
The Commission’s decisions 
Although the defining feature of mergers in this sample is that the Commission 
obviously considered the possibility of collective dominance, in the event, it 
actually intervened in only 25 (Table 4).  Hereafter, we refer to the two sub-
samples of mergers as: 
 
INTMERGERS: the 25 mergers in which the Commission 
intervened in one or more of the markets covered 
by the merger 
 
NONINTMERGERS:  the 37 mergers in which there was no intervention 
in any market - the merger was cleared without 
any remedy 
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The Commission’s report on any merger discusses each market in which 
there are overlaps between the merging parties.  In each case, it judges 
whether intervention is required in the market concerned.  A key feature of the 
25 INTMERGERS is that intervention at the merger level does not mean that 
intervention was required in all markets covered by the merger (Table 4).  
Indeed, in aggregate, these mergers involved 222 different markets, but the 
Commission chose to intervene in only just over half (118).  
 
Table 4 Types of decisions at the market level 
 
 Total INTMERGERS NONINTMERGERS 
Mergers 62 25 37 
Markets 367 222 145 
Non-interventions 249 104 145 
Interventions 118 118 0 
   of which: 
   
   SD 73 73 0 
   CD total 45 45 0 
     of which: 
   
       CD-DUO 29 29 0 
       CD-TRI 1 1 0 
       CD-LINKS 15 15 0 
 
 
Moreover, by no means all market interventions were to avoid collective 
dominance.  Usefully, the Commission reports spell out, for each market, the 
theory of harm which the intervention is designed to rectify – either single or 
collective dominance (hereafter SD and CD).  In fact, SD interventions 
outnumber CD decisions – 73 as opposed to 45. 
 
In summary then, there are two sub-samples in the CD sample, distinguishing 
whether or not the merger was challenged.  Even within the sub-sample 
where intervention did occur, there are differences between markets: single 
dominance, collective dominance and non-intervention are all possible.  
These turn out to be crucial features of the database. 
 
Markets with collective dominance 
Most commonly, the Commission identifies collective dominance as the theory 
of harm when the post-merger market would include just two remaining ‘large’ 
firms, who it believes would tacitly collude post-merger. We refer to these 29 
markets as CD-DUO. There is only one case in which collective dominance 
would involve 3 firms post-merger (CD-TRI) – the infamous Airtours merger.  
This is a striking finding: it appears that, in the eyes of the European 
Commission, collective dominance (tacit collusion) is effectively a problem 
associated with duopoly. 
There is however another class of cases which the commission identifies with 
collective dominance.  This is where the merger would lead to a market 
structure in which only a few significant players remain, and where one or 
more of them are ‘structurally linked’ in some way.  Most commonly, the links 
refer to common shareholders/shareholdings amongst a pair of firms, but 
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occasionally, they do not relate to common ownership, e.g. petrol swaps 
amongst the majors in retail petrol.  But in all such cases, the Commission 
treatment appears to be the same, namely linked firms are effectively viewed 
as a single entity.12  We refer to these cases as CD-LINKS. 
 
 
4   The oligopoly triangle 
 
This section presents a simple graphical device which helps specify the key 
dimensions of structure in this context.  It builds on two of the above features 
of the database: (i) the vast majority of markets in this sample are either 
monopolistic or duopolistic, and (ii) the Commission never associates 
collective dominance with markets of more than two significantly sized firms - 
with only one exception,  In these circumstances, a remarkably concise way of 
displaying the key structural features of the markets in this sample is to plot 
the market shares of the #1 and #2 ranked firms, post-merger.   
 
Literal triopoly 
In a market with just a literal triopoly of firms, plotting the market share of the 
largest firm (S1) against that of the second (S2) provide a complete 
characterisation of market structure.   
 
Figure 1 The Oligopoly Triangle 
S2
S1
S1=100-S2
S1=S2
S1=100-2S2
100%
100%
A (MON)
B (DUO)
C (TRI)
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 As an illustration, in M.1517 Rhodia/Donau Chemie/Albright & Wilson (1999), ‘Rhodia has structural 
links with Prayon…(and it) has been suggested that Rhodia and Prayon are commercially regarded as 
one block in the market. If this is true one might add Prayon’s…market share to the parties’. 
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First, note that the (S2, S1) point must lie in the small triangle ABC, bounded 
by the three lines shown in figure 1: 
 
S1=S2,  since S2 ≤ S1 
S1=100-S2,  since S1+S2≤100 
S1= 100-2S2,  since S3 ≤ S2 and therefore 100–S1-S2≤S2, i.e. 100–
2S2≤S1. 
 
Second, note that the three corners of ABC portray the three limiting market 
structures: monopoly (MON), symmetric duopoly (DUO) and symmetric 
triopoly (TRI).  Third, and more generally, representing concentration by the 
combined share of the two largest firms, this increases with moves in a 
northeasterly direction, being highest (100%) along AB, and lowest at C 
(67%).  Increasing size asymmetries between S1 and S2 moves the point in 
the direction from B to A, and increasing asymmetries between S1 and S3 
move it from C to A.  In such a literal triopoly, one might perhaps expect a CA 
to find dominance wherever the point was in this triangle – more likely, single 
dominance in the area towards A and collective dominance in the area 
towards B (duopoly) or C (triopoly). 
 
Interpretation of the triangle becomes less clear-cut once other smaller firms 
appear in the market (with aggregate share F). Although it remains true that 
the location of any point reveals both the level of concentration (S1+S2) and 
the degree of asymmetry between S1 and S2, there is now an indeterminacy 
on the relative sizes of S3 and F.  So long as F+S3≤S2, then the point will 
remain within ABC triangle, but now location at point C, for example, can not 
discriminate between literal triopoly and symmetric duopoly coupled with a 
large fringe.  More generally, with a more sizeable fringe, markets may be 
located below AC, and the diagram alone is insufficient to tell us anything 
other than the combined share and ratio of S1 and S2.  Having said this, as 
just noted, most markets in this sample have only one or two significant 
players, and the Commission has only in one instance judged a market to be 
collectively dominant by virtue of three large players. 
 
Relationship to HHI index 
The triangle also illustrates an important deficiency in the familiar Hirschman-
Herfindahl index (HHI) in this context.  Although this is widely used in 
competition economics and usually plays a prominent role in merger 
guidelines, it is a particularly blunt tool for identifying size asymmetries 
amongst the leading firms, and is misleading when attempting to identify the 
likelihood of collective dominance.  
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Figure 2  Iso-HHI curves in the Oligopoly Triangle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To illustrate why, figure 3 depicts a family of “iso-HHI curves”.  Each curve 
describes the locus of S1, S2 pairs consistent with a given HHI value 
(assuming N=313), and is quadratic in S1 and S214.  With increasing values of 
HHI, the curves move in a northerly direction, each having a maximum along 
AC and declining monotonically until its intersection with AB.  Thus, 
movements towards A are associated with higher concentration and high and 
increasing values of HHI should be useful indicators of the likelihood of single 
dominance.  But the same is not true for collective dominance.  As market 
structures become more symmetric, such as depicted by points B or C, the 
HHI index actually falls.  Moreover, HHI does not discriminate between 
structures which one might expect to be conducive to either single or 
collective dominance.  For example, the curve for HHI = 2500, shown in the 
figure, is consistent with both asymmetric triopoly (66.7, 16.3, 16.3) and 
perfectly symmetric duopoly (50, 50), structures likely to be indicative of single 
and collective dominance respectively.15 
 
Fitting the Commission’s decisions to the triangle 
As a descriptive preliminary to the econometrics below, Figure 3 uses the 
triangle construction to depict structures and decisions for the present 
database.  Thus, figure 3(a) shows all 367 markets, distinguishing the markets 
                                                 
13
 Or, equivalently, assuming that no firm outside the top 3 has a significant market share.  The HHI 
index is relatively insensitive to the addition of small firms because it is the sum of squared market 
shares. 
14
 Since HHI0 = S12 +S22 + S32 = 2S12 +2S22 – 2S1 – 2S2 + 2S1.S2 +1, then S12 +S22 – S1 – S2 + 
S1.S2 + (1- HHI0)/2= 0 
15
 Algebraically, this is because HHI is positively related to the magnitude of size asymmetries for given 
numbers.  It can easily be shown that HHI=(C2+1)/N, where C is the coefficient of variation of market 
share – an obvious measure of size inequalities.  
 
16,66 
HHI 
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with and without interventions.  Unsurprisingly, interventions are most 
common towards the top left corner, extending even below the literal triopoly 
segment of the diagram.  This indicates that in a market where a merger 
creates a singly dominant firm, intervention is likely, even where there is a 
sizeable fringe, so long as there is no other major player in the market.  On 
the other hand, non-intervention becomes much less likely in markets which 
lower concentration and with more symmetry between S1 and S2. 
 
Figure 3(b) is confined to the markets in the NONINTMERGERS sub-sample.  
By definition, none of the markets involved in these mergers was intervened.  
While the scatter is clearly less dispersed, clustering closer to the line of 
symmetry between S1 and S2, a number of these markets are highly 
concentrated – clearly, high concentration is insufficient for the Commission to 
intervene in a market.    
 
Figures 3(c) and 3(d) refer to the INTMERGERS sample of mergers.  As 
explained earlier, although all mergers in this sub-sample have some markets 
which were challenged, there are also a large number of markets in which no 
intervention was required.  It is this set of markets which forms the basis of the 
econometric modelling below.  As can be seen (figure 3(c)), the scatter is 
dispersed widely within and below the triangle, indicating a full range of 
differing market structures, both in terms of concentration and inequality 
between S1 and S2.   Finally, focussing only on those markets in 
INTMERGERS in which intervention occurred (figure 3(d)), and distinguishing 
single from collective dominance, there is clear evidence that, with some 
exceptions, the Commission typically employs a ‘symmetry screen’ to the 
sizes of S1 and S2 – very few interventions against collective dominance 
occur very far from the main diagonal.  Having said this, single dominance has 
sometimes been found for markets with fairly symmetric firm sizes. 
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Figure 3 Fitting the Sample Mergers and Markets to the Oligopoly Triangle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is clear from these simple diagrams that any explanation of the 
Commission’s decision-making should acknowledge two features of the size 
distribution – the level of concentration – which can be adequately captured 
here by the sum of S1 and S2, and some indicator of the inequality in size 
between the top two firms, S1/S2 or vice versa. 
 
 
5   A Model of the CA’s decision-making 
 
In its assessment of any horizontal merger, 16  we assume the European 
Commission makes a simultaneous 17  choice between three alternative 
options, for each market covered by the merger in which the parties have 
overlapping market shares: 
 
• NI:  Non intervention 
• SD: Intervention by requiring remedies18 to avoid Single Dominance 
                                                 
16
 For simplicity, we do not discriminate between whether the decision requires relatively brief or more 
extensive analysis (phases 1 and 2 respectively in the European context).  
17
 Below, we also test an alternative, two stage, sequence in which the CA first decides whether or not 
to intervene, and then, if intervening, whether on the grounds of single or collective dominance. 
18
 As throughout, ‘remedies’ includes, as a rare occurrence, outright prohibition, in which case the 
decision applies to all mergers covered by the merger. 
 
Figure 3(a) All markets, all mergers
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Legend: 
(a)-(c)  INT: ●   NONINT ×  
(d)  CD: ●     SD & CD-LINKS ○  
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• CD: Intervention by requiring remedies to avoid Collective Dominance 
 
The choice is based on an assessment of the likelihood of competitive harm, 
employing the published guidelines.19  These typically enumerate a list of 
relevant merger and market characteristics.  For convenience, these are 
referred to as: 
 
o S, a vector of structural indicators S: market shares, concentration 
and changes therein,  
 
o X, a checklist vector of market characteristics X: the existence of 
entry barriers, price transparency (in the case of collective dominance), 
absence of buyer power amongst customers, excess capacity etc.,   
 
o Sometimes, the CA also refers to subsidiary evidence of competition 
and potential competition, beyond these merely static measures.  This 
might include the scope for future supply side substitution from outside 
the narrowly defined industry, competition for the market (innovation), 
fluctuating market shares, etc..  We refer to these in shorthand as 
dynamic measures of competition. 
 
It is assumed that the X variables have the status of a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for finding dominance (competitive harm).  For example, 
given free entry or strong buyer power, the Commission will not judge the 
merger to have any competitive harm – regardless of the level of 
concentration or market shares of the leading players.  But where the 
conditions are satisfied, the merger is deemed to have the potential for 
dominance, and we refer to the merger as satisfying the necessary X 
conditions in the market concerned.  Crucially, although these X 
characteristics are observable by the CA, they are inherently unmeasurable in 
any objective way by the econometrician.   
 
The dynamic measures play a less pervasive conclusive role – they are not 
always explicitly referred to in reports and do not appear to be routinely 
factored into the decision process.  Therefore, we do not attribute them with 
the status of necessary conditions, nor do we attempt to include them in the 
estimation below. 
 
 
Specification of the structural model 
On the other hand, the structural indicators are observed, measured and 
reported in decisions by the Commission.  We assume that the Commission 
employs a consistent structural model, based on these indicators, in 
evaluating whether the merger would result in a market structure leading to 
potential competitive harm, and, if so, whether from single or collective 
dominance.  The purpose of the econometric analysis below is to identify the 
form of this structural model. 
                                                 
19
 See the guidelines for the US: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm, and the EU: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/c_031/c_03120040205en00050018.pdf 
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It is hypothesised that the Commission’s structural model has two dimensions: 
 
• the level of concentration and  
• size symmetries amongst the leading players 
 
In general, there is a wide variety of candidate measures for both, but we can 
readily narrow down the choice here by appealing to the above descriptive 
analysis.  We know that it is rare for the European Commission to intervene in 
markets where the share of the largest two firms is not large, and with only 
one exception, collective dominance is never confirmed with more than two 
players involved.  Therefore, we opt for the simplest specifications, requiring 
information on only the market shares of the largest two firms:20 
 
• concentration is measured by the sum of the market shares of the two 
largest players, post-merger: SUM = S1+S2 
 
• size symmetry is measured by the ratio of the market shares of the two 
largest players, post-merger: RATIO = S2/S1 
 
Since CA guidelines typically refer to both the potential levels and changes of 
market shares and concentration post-merger, we also include: 
 
• Change in concentration: CHASUM 
 
• Change in asymmetry: CHARATIO 
 
From the descriptive triangles above, expectations are straightforward: higher 
values of SUM and CHASUM should make both collective and single 
dominance more likely, and higher values of RATIO and CHARATIO should 
make collective dominance more likely than single dominance.    
 
Given these assumptions, the CA’s decision can be specified as in two parts: 
I Are the necessary X conditions for potential dominance satisfied?  
II If yes, does the structural model point to SD, CD or neither?  
 
Although it might be natural to think of this as a sequential two-part decision, 
in practice we suspect that CAs typically collect the required data, and answer 
the two questions, simultaneously.  In any event, the sequence is irrelevant for 
our purposes - all that matters is that the structural model only effectively 
comes into play when the necessary X conditions are satisfied.  
 
We assume that the choice between the three alternatives can be modelled 
using a multinomial logit estimator (MNL).  Thus, using the conventional 
                                                 
20
 In general, one might expect that the shares of the 3rd largest and other smaller firms might also play 
a role, but, to anticipate, experiments distinguishing S3 from the fringe of smaller firms add no 
explanatory power to the estimated model. Also, note that, in this formulation of the model, firms 1 and 2 
are ‘anonymous’ in the sense that the merged firm might be ranked either number 1 or 2, or neither.  In 
fact, in 71% of all markets in this sample, the merged firm would become: #1 post-merger, and #2 or #3 
in 23% and 5% respectively. 
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terminology,21 for market j in merger i, the ‘utility’ the Commission derives 
from choosing action k (k= NI, CD or SD) is:  
 
Uijk = aijk + bijk SUMij + cijk CHASUM + dijk RATIOij + eijk CHARATIOij + εijk (1) 
 
where ε
 
is an unobservable error term, assumed to be mutually independent 
distributed according to a Type I extreme value distribution. 
 
The probability that the Commission chooses action k is as follows: 
 
 if the necessary X conditions are satisfied: 
 
Pr{yij = k} = Pr{Uijk = max (UijNI, UijSD, UijCD}     
 (2a) 
 
 if the necessary X conditions are not satisfied, 
 
Pr{yij = NI} = 1, Pr{yij = SD} = Pr{yij = CD}= 0     
 (2b) 
 
Note that, in employing this model of decision-making, we make the 
assumption that the choice between the alternatives is simultaneous, and of 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).  Below, we test for IIA and 
also experiment with an alternative two-stage decision process.  
 
 
 
6  Empirical Methodology 
 
Our purpose here is to isolate the form and parameters of the structural 
model, as in equation (1), having ‘controlled’ for the other X market 
characteristics.  However, this presents a major methodological problem.  We 
have argued that these other characteristics, while observable by the 
Commission, are inherently unmeasurable in any ‘objective’ manner by 
outside researchers: concepts such as barriers to entry, buyer power and 
price transparency defy direct measurement.  Moreover, we prefer not to 
follow the traditional route of ‘measuring’ the X variables by constructing 
proxies and/or categorical dummy variables, based on available qualitative 
information.  Although this has been the norm in the previous literature in this 
area, (see section 2), we find this unattractive for the following reason.  The 
only practicable source of evidence on these characteristics is the information 
provided by the CA itself in its merger reports, and this poses two problems.  
First, many reports are short and do not include sufficient information.  
Second, even if one were able to form an accurate reading of the 
Commission’s assessment for every relevant market characteristic in every 
case, by its nature, such an exercise would be intrinsically logically circular.  
Ultimately, a merger report is a subjective justification by the decision-maker 
of its decision.  Since the decision-makers are publicly accountable, ultimately 
                                                 
21
 See, for example, Greene (2003, section 21.7) 
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to the courts, it is highly improbable that they will cite ‘evidence’ which is 
contrary to their own published guidelines.  For instance, it is unlikely that any 
CA would intervene in a market unless it believed that entry barriers were 
significant.  As such, to construct an explanatory variable recording entry 
barriers as ‘high’, based on statements to that effect in the report, would be to 
construct a variable which would be a more or less perfect predictor.  
 
Identifying an appropriate sub-sample: INTMERGERS 
Our solution to this problem is to employ a methodology which avoids the 
need to ‘measure’ these X variables.  Instead, we proceed by carefully 
selecting a sample of markets for which there is reason to believe that all the 
necessary X conditions are satisfied, and then, only within that sample, to 
attempt to discriminate between the Commission’s decisions (CD, SD or NI) in 
terms of the structural model. 
 
To identify such a sample, we recall an important feature of the sample 
mergers and then introduce an additional assumption.  First, recall from 
section 3.3 (fact D) that virtually every merger in the CD sample, although 
usually multimarket, impacts on a set of very closely related markets.  Thus, in 
55 of the 62, all markets covered by each merger are located within the same 
4-digit NACE industry.  We now introduce an additional assumption:  
 
Mergers are X-homogeneous: all markets covered by a given merger 
share the same X market characteristics. 
 
In other words, we assume that all X market characteristics are substantively 
similar merger-wide, rather than being market-specific within the merger.  This 
is clearly an approximation, but not unreasonable if the product characteristics 
and supply conditions are broadly similar for a given product market in 
different countries, or to very closely related narrow markets within the same 
4-digit industry.  So, for example, if there is insufficient buyer power, potential 
for entry etc to constrain dominance in the Belgian widget market, the same is 
likely to also be true for the widget market in all other member states. 
   
If so, it follows that, if the Commission is observed to have intervened in the 
market for blue widgets in Belgium, the necessary X conditions for dominance 
will have been satisfied not only for Belgian blue widgets, but also, by 
implication, for all other markets covered by the same merger (e.g. blue 
widgets in France, red widgets in Belgium etc). 
 
This line of reasoning suggests that we can assume that the necessary X 
conditions for dominance will have been satisfied for all markets covered by 
any merger in which the Commission has intervened in one or more markets.  
The set of mergers satisfying this criterion is the INTMERGERS sub-sample 
as described earlier.  As such, this sub-sample provides scope for a controlled 
experiment, in which the necessary X conditions have been controlled for 
(satisfied), leaving the opportunity to apply the structural model to discriminate 
between the Commission’s decisions for all markets within those mergers. It 
should be stressed that this is not a circular exercise.  Although, for each of 
these mergers, the Commission intervened in at least one market, it did not 
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intervene in all markets.  As shown in Table 4, the 25 mergers in 
INTMERGERS account for 222 different markets, in which there are 
differences not only in the nature of intervention (45 for CD and 73 for SD), 
but also a sizeable number of markets (104) in which there was no 
intervention.   
 
An indirect test of X-homogeneity 
Given the central role of the X-homogeneity assumption in this research 
design, a test of its validity is clearly desirable.  Direct tests are impossible, 
given the inherent unmeasurability of many of the X-characteristics, but an 
indirect test is feasible.  This uses one other convenient feature of the 
database. 
  
Whenever the Commission decides not to intervene in a market, it typically 
explains its reasons – usually in terms of market structure variables, the X 
market characteristics and sometimes also the dynamic measures of 
competition.  This provides the opportunity to assess the model in terms of its 
predictive power for individual observations (markets).  We use this 
information in three ways to test the X-homogeneity assumption. 
 
First, when fitting the model only to the (appropriate) INTMERGERS, 
assuming that we have correctly specified the structural model and that X-
homogeneity is valid, we should expect not only a close fit, (i.e. few incorrect 
predictions) but also, where the equation does incorrectly predict intervention 
in a market, the Commission’s stated reasons for non-intervention should 
include neither market structure reasons nor the absence of necessary X 
conditions. 
 
Second, when the model is fitted (inappropriately) to the full sample, including 
mergers in NONINTMERGERS, incorrect predictions of intervention are to be 
expected for both sets of reasons.  A number of NONINTMERGERS mergers 
will presumably not have satisfied the necessary X conditions.  Moreover, 
since the X variables are necessarily excluded from the model, not only is a 
poorer predictive power probable, but also the estimated parameters of the 
structural variables are likely to be biased.  Biased estimates of the structural 
model may therefore incorrectly predict interventions – even in those cases 
where the necessary X conditions are satisfied.  
 
Third, returning to the estimated parameters from the INTMERGERS 
equation, these can be used to predict (out of sample) decisions for 
NONINTMERGERS.  In this case, because estimates should not be biased, 
the proportion of incorrect predictions should decline and crucially, all should 
correspond to cases where the Commission cites the absence of necessary X 
conditions. 
 
 
7  Results 
 
The results of fitting the multinomial logit are reported in Table 5.   Initially 
(Table 5(i)), the model is estimated excluding CHASUM and CHARATIO 
 25 
because, for about a quarter of all markets, the Commission’s reports provide 
insufficient information on the pre-merger market shares.22  Table 5(ii) reports 
the results for the smaller sample for which we are able to compute pre- and 
post-merger shares, and thus the changes.  
 
Table 5(i)  Multinomial logit results, levels  
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Sample INTMERGER Total Total INTMERGER 
N 222 367 367 222 
SD     
HHI   0.00104** 
(0.000104) 
0.00114** 
(0.000187) 
SUM 0.0608** 
(0.0101) 
0.0494** 
(0.0114) 
  
RATIO -5.650** 
(1.175) 
-7.554** 
(1.096) 
  
Constant -1.521** 
(0.540) 
-0.551 
(0.711) 
-4.540** 
(0.490) 
-3.718** 
(0.451) 
     
CD     
HHI   0.000489** 
(0.000134) 
0.000663** 
(0.00025) 
SUM 0.0985** 
(0.0191) 
0.0602** 
(0.0158) 
  
RATIO 8.508** 
(2.171) 
4.437** 
(1.413) 
  
Constant -14.524** 
(2.162) 
-9.907** 
(1.644) 
-3.525** 
(0.644) 
-2.987** 
(0.727) 
     
Pseudo R2 0.445 0.385 0.212 0.244 
LL -121.8 -182.2 -233.4 -165.9 
     
Correct 
predictions  
(%) 
79 80 77 66 
SD (%) 77 66 43 66 
CD All (%) 80 32 27 32 
   CD-DUO & 
TRI           
69 0 0 0 
   CD-LINKS 100 93 80 93 
NI (%) 80 93 95 81 
Estimated standard errors in parentheses, ** indicates significance at 99% level, * at the 95% 
level.  Equations are estimated with observations clustered by merger, and are corrected for 
any heteroscedasticity.  
 
 
                                                 
22
 In other words, the Commission only reports the post-merger share of the merged firm (i.e. the sum of 
the merged parties’ pre-merger shares), and not their individual pre-merger shares. 
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Table 5(ii) Multinomial logit results, including changes 
 
 (v) (vi) 
Sample INTMERGER INTMERGER 
N 174 174 
SD   
HHI  0.000795** 
(0.0000694) 
CHAHHI  0.00352** 
(0.00103) 
SUM 0.0881** 
(0.0143) 
 
RATIO -4.363** 
(1.691) 
 
CHASUM 0.0608 
(0.0510) 
 
CHARATIO -5.831** 
(2.129) 
 
Constant -5.472** 
(1.098) 
-5.190** 
(0.580) 
   
CD   
HHI  0.000665* 
(0.000288) 
CHAHHI  0.00150 
(0.000957) 
SUM 0.104** 
(0.018) 
 
RATIO 8.707** 
(2.535) 
 
CHASUM 0.0800* 
(0.0397) 
 
CHARATIO -2.442 
(1.534) 
 
Constant -15.69*** -3.833** 
(0.912) 
   
Pseudo R2 0.495 0.349 
LL -87.5 -112.7 
   
Correct predictions 
(%) 
78 74 
SD (%) 75 74 
CD All (%)  77 23 
    CD-DUO & TRI 71 0 
    CD-LINKS   100 100 
NI (%) 80 93 
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Equation (i) shows our preferred version: the structural model fitted only to the 
markets in INTMERGERS. 23  As can be seen, CD and SD are both 
significantly more likely the higher is concentration (SUM); and single 
(collective) dominance is less (more) likely the larger (smaller) is RATIO: thus, 
we can confirm the expectation that collective dominance becomes more 
likely the more equally sized are the top two firms.  The model successfully 
predicts the Commission’s decisions (including CD) in roughly 80% of all 
markets. A standard χ2 test confirms that we can accept the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives. 
    
 
Figure 4 Predicted decisions within the triangle (from eqn. (i), Table 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the results graphically in terms of the oligopoly triangle.  
The three regions are computed using the estimated parameters from (i) and 
depict for the {S1,S2} pairs the decision which the equation predicts as most 
probable.  We return to a numerical translation in the next section, but, for the 
moment, note that collective dominance is the most likely outcome for only a 
relatively small area located near to the point of symmetric duopoly.   
 
Equation (ii) fits the same equation, but now (inappropriately) to the full 
sample including mergers in NONINTMERGERS.  The signs and significance 
of coefficients are unaffected but now the model fails completely to correctly 
                                                 
23
 In all results shown, the CD-LINKS cases are treated as single dominance decisions, recording the 
market shares of structurally linked firms as single entities.  This is in accordance with the Commission’s 
own reports, although they do not refer to CD-LINKS as equivalent to single dominance.   In preliminary 
experiments, not shown here, equation (i) was first estimated excluding and then including the 15 cases 
concerned in INTMERGERS – all coefficients estimates and significance were virtually identical across 
the two equations. 
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predict cases of collective dominance.24  This confirms our expectation that 
failing to control for the excluded X variables (as in NONINTMERGERS) 
seriously impairs the predictive power of the model.  As can also be seen, the 
point estimates of the coefficients in (ii) are noticeably different from those in 
(i).  Again, this is to be expected: estimating the model on a sample which 
includes an omitted variable which might be expected to differ significantly 
between INMERGERS and NONINTMERGERS may well lead to biased 
estimates. 
 
Equations (iii) and (iv) provide a yardstick against which to assess our model.  
In this case, the HHI index is used as the structural measure, first for 
INTMERGERS, then for the full sample.  While the estimated coefficients in 
both equations show that both types of intervention are significantly more 
likely the higher is the HHI index, the fit is quite low and the equation fails to 
correctly predict25 any CD decisions and less than half of the Commission’s 
SD interventions.  This confirms the earlier expectation from figure 2 that the 
HHI index is a very blunt tool for identifying likely cases of collective 
dominance.   
 
We now turn to the second step in our tests of the model: close examination 
of the model’s incorrect predictions of CD.  When estimated on the 
(appropriate) INTMERGERS, the model predicts collective dominance in 42 
markets (column 1 of Table 5). Only seven of these predictions are incorrect, 
in that the Commission decided against intervention.  Moreover, in none of the 
seven does the Commission cite as its reason for non-intervention the 
absence of the necessary X conditions.  This offers very strong support for our 
key assumption of Merger X-homogeneity – there is no evidence for this sub-
sample that exclusion of X variables has compromised the estimates.  On the 
other hand, when estimated on the full sample, as explained already, the 
model does not successfully predict any of the cases of collective dominance, 
except for those involving structural links.   
 
However, when applying the estimated coefficients from equation (i) to predict 
outcomes (out of sample) for NONINTMERGERS, collective dominance is 
predicted for 43 of the 145 markets concerned.  Of course, these predictions 
are all incorrect – by construction, INTMERGERS sample includes all mergers 
in which the Commission decided not to intervene in any of the markets.  
What is relevant here are the reasons given by the Commission for non-
intervention in these 43 markets.  As can be seen, (column 2 of Table 6), for 
33 of the markets, the Commission’s cited reasons were that one or more of 
the necessary X conditions was not satisfied – most frequently, that price was 
not transparent.  Again, this is strong support for our strategy of focussing on 
the INTMERGER sub-sample.  It is clear that, outside of these mergers, the 
necessary X conditions are frequently not satisfied, making it impossible to 
isolate structural factors. 
 
                                                 
24
 Except CD-LINKS which, as explained in the previous note, are treated here as single dominance, 
having added together the post-merger shares of the linked firms.   
25
 Throughout, conventionally, we take the model’s predicted outcome as the one with the highest 
probability of SD, CD and NI.  
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Turning more briefly to the other reasons for non-intervention, structural 
reasons were given in two cases within INTMERGERS and four within 
NONINTMERGERS.  Arguably, these are the markets for which the structural 
model ‘fails’.  However, these may equally be interpreted as evidence of 
inconsistent decision-making by the Commission – the proportions are not 
large (5% and 10% respectively) and such a relatively low incidence of 
inconsistency would not be surprising over a 15 year period covering 
hundreds of different markets.  Finally, in about 10% of the markets in which 
the Commission chose not to intervene, the reason given was supplementary 
evidence that competition was still likely to be effective, in spite of high static 
concentration, because of dynamic factors.  Since our structural model is 
static and has not attempted to capture such factors, such explanations are 
relegated in effect to the disturbance term.   
  
 
 
Table 6 Incorrect predictions of Collective Dominance: reasons cited by Commission 
for non-intervention 
 
 INTMERGER NONINTMERGER 
Markets for which CD predicted 42 43 
     of which CA did not intervene 7 (16%) 43 (100%) 
   
Explanations for non-intervention 
Necessary X factors not satisfied 0 33 (78%) 
Of which:   
     Price not transparent 0 26 
     Buyer Power 0 5 
     Easy Entry 0 5 
     Excess Capacity 0 5 
     Differentiated products 0 8 
   
Structural reasons 2 (5%) 4 (10%) 
     Asymmetric/fluctuating market 
shares 
1 2 
     Strong 3rd player etc. 1 2 
   
Evidence of dynamic competition 4 (9%) 5 (12%) 
     Innovation etc. 1 4 
     Fluctuating market shares 3 1 
   
Only small increment in market 
share 
1 (2%)  
 
Part (ii) of Table 5 re-estimates the model for INTMERGERS, but now 
including the change variables CHARATIO and CHASUM, albeit for a smaller 
sample size (N = 174).  Results are fairly robust to the reduction in sample 
size, the overall fit is substantively unchanged, as are the signs, magnitudes 
and significance of coefficient estimates on SUM and RATIO.  The estimated 
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coefficients on the new variable, CHASUM, are consistent with the 
expectation that mergers which increase concentration by more are more 
likely to attract intervention, but not significantly so for SD.  The estimated 
coefficient on CHARATIO suggests that the more the merger increases size 
equality, the less likely the Commission is to find SD, but this variable is 
insignificant (with the ‘wrong’ sign) for CD.  Overall, this is not conclusive 
evidence that the structural model includes an important recognition of the 
magnitudes of the changes, as well as of the levels.  Again, merely for 
comparative purposes, equation (vi) returns to the HHI index, as an alternative 
to our structural model, now including both the level and change in HHI.  As 
before, the equation completely fails to correctly predict any CD cases (except 
CD-LINKS).   
 
In a variety of other unreported results, we have experimented with alternative 
functional forms for the structural model, but they add nothing to predictive 
power.  We have also included other explanatory variables – for consistency 
with practice in the previous literature.  However, distinguishing between the 
phases of the decisions, the identities of the Competition Commissioners, and 
whether the geographical market definition relates to individual member 
states, as opposed to the World or the EEA, again fails to identify any 
additional significant effects.  
 
Finally, we have also experimented with a two stage probit model, with the 
first stage explaining whether or not the Commission intervenes, and the 
second stage explaining the type of prediction (whether SD or CD) in those 
markets where intervention occurs.  When judged by predictive power – 
measured as above by proportion of correct predictions – this model performs 
noticeably worse than the Multinomial Logit. 
 
 
8   Implications and conclusions 
 
As explained in the introduction, the immediate purpose of this paper was to 
identify the European Commission’s (implicit) model of collective dominance 
in the context of mergers.  Beyond this, we argued that this might provide 
some indirect empirical evidence on the structural conditions under which tacit 
collusion might arise in real world markets.  Here, we review both objectives in 
the light of results. 
 
The Commission’s model of collective dominance 
It is clear that the Commission views collective dominance as a rare 
occurrence.  Over a 15 year period, covering about 3,000 mergers, we have 
only identified 62 (about 2%) in which the merger report includes a non-trivial 
discussion of the possibility that the merger might involve collective 
dominance in at least one of the markets covered by the merger.  Even 
amongst these cases, the Commission only actually intervened by requiring 
remedies (or very rarely outright prohibition) to avoid collective dominance in 
44 of the 367 markets (11%) covered by those mergers.  Thus, the aggregate 
probability that a merger might lead to collective dominance in a particular 
market is only 0.2% 
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In assessing the likelihood of collective dominance in a given market, the 
Commission is guided by both market structural variables and a set of other 
market characteristics, such as price transparency and entry barriers.  It 
appears that both sets of variables have the status of necessary conditions – 
the Commission requires not only that the structural indicators are consistent 
with tacit collusion, but also that the price is transparent, entry is difficult, etc.   
 
On the structural side, both high concentration and reasonably symmetric 
market shares of the leading players are required.  Strikingly, with only one 
exception, collective dominance has never been associated with more than 
just two firms.  Our results have helped quantify what is meant in practice by 
symmetry.  As shown earlier in Figure 4, there is only a very restricted range 
of values for the market shares of the two firms in which collective dominance 
can arise.  As can be seen from the figure, if the larger firm has no more than 
a quarter of the market (S1<25%) the Commission will not intervene, while if it 
has more than 60%, the decision will be single dominance.  It is only in the 
intermediate range that the share of the second firm becomes important.  So 
long as S1<52%, anything is possible: single dominance if S2 is very small, 
no intervention if S2 is sufficiently large to counteract the potential dominance 
of the larger firm, or collective dominance as the two firms become more 
equally sized.  For example, at S1=40, the decision will be single dominance 
for S2<12, non-intervention for 12<S2<33, and collective dominance for 
S2>33.  Once S1>52%, non-intervention is no longer a possibility, and the 
choice is simply between single and collective dominance.  For example, if 
S1=50%, single dominance is found unless S2>35%.    
 
Table 7  Possible outcomes at different sizes for #1 ranked firm 
 
S1 (%) NI CD SD 
‘Low, <25 √   
‘Intermediate’, 25-52 √ √ √ 
‘Intermediate-high’,53-60  √ √ 
‘High’, >60   √ 
 
However, as explained, these estimates refer only to the structural potential 
for collective dominance.  It is also necessary that a series of other key market 
characteristics (the necessary X conditions) are conducive to dominance. An 
important thesis of this paper is that because many of these market 
characteristics are not only necessary conditions, but also inherently 
unmeasurable it is difficult both to quantify their significance, and to isolate the 
underlying structural model.  Our solution to this problem has been to attempt 
to isolate their impact by careful sample selection.  We now return to the 
earlier results in Table 6 to tease out an assessment of just how important 
these other characteristics are. 
 
Recall first that Table 6 records the frequencies with which each of these 
variables were cited by the Commission as a reason for non-intervention in 
those cases where our model predicted that the structural indicators were 
consistent with collective dominance.  Now combining the INTMERGERS and 
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NONINTMERGERS sub-samples, there are 85 markets for which the 
structural model predicts collective dominance 26  – conditional on the X 
conditions being satisfied.  Of these, the Commission did not, in fact, 
intervene in 50, in 33 of which it reports that the X conditions were not 
satisfied.  In that sense, we estimate that the probability that the Commission 
will not intervene, in spite of market shares which would otherwise suggest 
collective dominance, because the X conditions are not satisfied is 0.41 
(=33/85).   
 
The wider significance of our results for tacit collusion 
Turning to the implications of these results for advancing our wider 
understanding of tacit collusion, what have we learned?  One perfectly tenable 
response, is “nothing, unless one can really trust in the ability of a CA to 
correctly identify such markets.”  But putting aside disbelief, at least for the 
sake of the argument, some of the above results provide fascinating contrasts 
with findings from adjacent literatures.   
 
Consider first firm numbers.  Here, tacit collusion is virtually never identified 
with more than two firms.  Intriguingly, this resonates with the message which 
is emerging from the experimental literature on tacit collusion.  For example, 
Huck et al (2004), surveying the literature, suggest that there is some 
evidence of collusion occurring in duopoly settings, but, in contrast, collusion 
is rarely found when there are more than two firms. In their own Cournot 
experiment, varying the number of firms supports this finding: collusion is 
sometimes found with only two firms, but with three firms Cournot Nash 
equilibrium behaviour is usual, and with four or more firms even more 
competitive behaviour is sometimes found. This is in marked contrast with 
what we know from the empirical literature on cartels, where very often far 
more than just two firms are involved.   On asymmetries, there appears to be 
little or no systematic evidence from either the empirical cartel literature or 
from experimental work.  However, a casual reading of the official reports on 
real world cartels suggests that they often involve sets of firms with far greater 
market share asymmetries than those we have found in the current sample of 
collective dominance mergers.  This is a topic on which further research is 
merited. 
 
More generally, contrasting the literatures on hard-core and soft (tacit) 
collusion turns out to be thought-provoking in a number of respects.  It raises 
the obvious question: “are tacit collusion and cartels substitutes?”; 27  for 
example, do firms only look to form cartels when the legally safer option of 
tacit collusion is unattainable? A further speculative thought is provoked by 
the Commission’s readiness to intervene against a given merger in some 
markets on the grounds that it will create single dominance, but in others to 
avoid collective dominance.  Are single and collective dominance seen as 
alternatives, not only by CAs but also by the firms themselves?  After all, if 
                                                 
26
  Recall that the 42 within INTMERGERS are within-sample and the 43 in NONINTMERGER are 
outside-of-sample predictions (generated by applying the model estimated on INTMERGERS to the 
values of the structural variables observed in the NONINTMERGERS sample). 
27
 This was the subject of an exploratory presentation made by one of the authors with Hviid (2006).  
http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/publicfiles/Events/collusion_slides.pdf 
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tacit collusion is unsustainable because of large asymmetries within the 
group, the implication is that one (or more) firms must enjoy some significant 
advantage over the others.  If so, the choice for the larger firms may well be 
between pursuing unilateral behaviour designed to exploit that advantage and 
tacit collusion.  Questions such as these raise doubts that the same 
theoretical model may not be appropriate for all forms of collusion, as well as 
questioning whether the alternative to either cartels or tacit collusion is 
necessarily the competitive outcome.  Empirically, it suggests a wider 
research agenda directed by the question: “are there well-defined (i.e. 
observable and predictable) differences between the conditions which give 
rise to tacit collusion, hard core collusion (cartels), and single dominance?   
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Annex 1   The CD Sample 
 
Year Merger Phase  Decision 
1992 M.190 Nestle/Perrier  2 CD 
1993 M. 308 Kali+Salz/MDK/Treuhand 2  CD 
1993 M.337 Allied Signal/Knorr Bremse 1  NI 
1993 M.358 Pilkington/SIV 2  NI 
1994 M.390 Akzo/Nobel Industries  1  NI 
1994 M.315 Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva  2  NI 
1994 M.484 Krupp/Thyssen/Riva/Faleck/Tadfin/ASD 2 NI 
1996 M.619 Gencor/Lonhro Prob CD 
1996 M.3314 Air Liquide/Messer Targets 1  CD&SD 
1996 M.821 Baxter/Immuno 1  NI 
1996 M.818 Cardo/Thyssen 1 NI 
1998 M.1082 Allianz/AGF 1  CD 
1998 M.1229 American Home Products/Monsanto 1 SD 
1998 M. 1225 Enso/Stora  2 NI 
1998 M. 1164 GEC/Alsthom/Cegelec 1 NI 
1998 M. 1230 Glaverbel/PPG 1 NI 
1998 M.1016 PriceWaterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand 2  NI 
1998 M. 1223 Tyco International/US Surgical Corp 1  NI 
1998 M. 1245 Valeo/ITT Industries  1  NI 
1999 M.1467 Rohm and Haas/ Morton 1  CD 
1999 M.1524 Airtours/First Choice Prob CD 
1999 M.1378  Hoechst/ Rhône – Poulenc  1  SD 
1999 M.1517 Rhodia/Donau Chemie/Albright & Wilson 1  CD&SD 
1999 M.1313 Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier 2  CD&SD 
1999 M.1571 New Holland/Case 1  CD&SD 
1999 M.1681 Akzo Nobel/Hoechst Roussel Vet 1  CD&SD 
1999 M. 1383 Exxon/Mobil  2  CD&SD 
1999 M.1551 AT&T/Mediaone 1  NI 
1999 M. 1432 Agfa-Gevaert/Stirling  1 NI 
1999 M.1539 CVC/Danone/Gerresheimer 1  NI 
1999 M.1363 Dupont/Hoechst/Herberts 1  NI 
1999 M. 1440 Lucent Technologies/Ascend 
Communications  
1  NI 
1999 M. 1491 Robert Bosch/Magneti Marelli  1  NI 
1999 M. 1494 SAIR Group/AOM 1  NI 
2000 M.2016 France Telecom/Orange 1  CD 
2000 M.1741 MCI Worldcom/Sprint Prob  SD 
2000 M.1663 Alcan/Alusuisse 2  CD&SD 
2000 M.1630 Air Liquide/BOC 2  CD&SD 
2000 M.1882 Pirelli/BICC 2  NI 
2001 M.2389 Shell/DEA and M. 2533 BP/E.ON* 2  CD  
2001 M.2420 Mitsui/CVRD/CAEMI 2  SD  
2001 M.2097 SCA/Metsä Tissue Prob  CD&SD 
2001 M.2314 BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim 2  NI 
2001 M. 2348 Outokumpu/Norzink 1  NI 
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2001 M.2537 Philips/Marconi Medical Systems 1  NI 
2001 M.2498 UPM-Kymmene/Haindl 2  NI 
2002 M.2690 Solvay/Montedison-Ausimont 1  CD&SD 
2002 M.2886 Bunge/Cereol  1  NI 
2002 M. 2810 Deloitte & Touche/Anderson UK 1  NI 
2002 M. 2816 Ernst & Young France/Anderson France 1 NI 
2002 M. 2824 Ernst & Young/Anderson Germany  1 NI 
2002 M.2702 Norsk Hydro/Vaw 1  NI 
2002 M.2838 P&O Stena Line (Holding) Limited 1  NI 
2002 M. 2965 Staples/Guilbert 1 NI 
2003 M.2972 DSM/Roche Vitamins 2 SD 
2003 M.3197 Candover/Cinven/Bertelsmann-Springer 1  SD 
2003 M.3225 Alcan/Pechiney (II)  1 SD 
2003 M.3287 Agco/Valtra 1 NI 
2003 M.3276 Anglo American/Kumba Resources 1 NI 
2003 M.3268 Sydkraft/Graninge 1 NI 
2003 M.3060 UCB/Solutia  1 NI 
2004 M.3333 Sony/BMG 2  NI 
Prob indicates outright prohibition. 
* These two mergers were treated simultaneously in a single judgement by 
the Commission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
